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menajú, jednak si nie sme istí, či vôbec hrajú úlohu slov. Po tom, ako si osvojil uve-
denú filozofickú hypotézu, podliehame iba dojmu, že narábame s jazykom (že čítame 
text). Z Wittgensteinovho uhla pohľadu sa zaoberáme skôr symptómami niečoho 
úplne iného. 
Nevieme si byť istí, či rozumieme karteziánskemu hlasu, alebo nie. Z mojej per-
spektívy je toto ten najdôležitejší jednotlivý výsledok celej kritickej analýzy. 
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Descartes insists, “[...] there is a deceiver of supreme power and cunning who is 
deliberately and constantly deceiving me. In that case I too undoubtedly exist, if 
he is deceiving me [...]” (AT-VII, 25; CSM-II, 17). In what way can we draw 
evidence that our existence can be drawn from our being deceived? The inter-
pretations that the earlier studies have shown is not a monolith. Then I will se-
arch for some inherent characteristics of deception, and analyse the construction 
of the reasoning, “if a deceiver deceives me, I exist.” To be concrete, I show: 1) 
that it is not “I exist” but “I think” that is concluded from the supposition               
“a deceiver deceives me/I am deceived by a deceiver”; 2) that the attributions of 
the self as a thinking thing, i.e. understanding, affirming, and denying (AT-VII, 
28; CSM-II, 19), are discovered in the very supposition of a deceiver. 
Keywords: Descartes – Meditationes de prima philosophia – Cogito – Deceiver ar-
gument – Skepticism
1. Introduction 
Science holds true under the condition that the human intellect is genuine (in the sense 
that it can grasp truths). Science would lose all the significance and validity if the 
human intellect had not been created with the ability to grasp them. According to the 
ancient Skeptic, especially Pyrrhonism, we cannot make a firm judgement on 
anything and therefore cannot construct science. Descartes makes use of the views of 
the Skeptic to lay the foundation of his system of metaphysics in the First and Second 
Meditations, as it is well-known. The following is where Descartes’ methodological 
doubt is deepened extremely, and the most crucial for this study:  
                                                        
1 I wish to thank Dr. Yoshinori Tsuzaki, Associate Professor at University of Tsukuba, for helpful 
discussions. Readers can find more on this topic in another article of mine that was published in 
Japanese: 田村, 歩. (2018): デカルトにおける〈欺かれる私〉について――欺かれるという
事態からは何が帰結するのか. 哲學, 69, 200-214.  
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[I] But I have convinced myself that there is absolutely nothing in the world, no sky, 
no earth, no minds, no bodies. Does it now follow that I too do not exist? No: if I 
convinced myself of something then I certainly existed. [II] But there is a deceiver of 
supreme power and cunning who is deliberately and constantly deceiving me. In that 
case I too undoubtedly exist, if he is deceiving me; and [III] let him deceive me as 
much as he can, he will never bring it about that I am nothing so long as I think that 
I am something. (AT-VII, 25; CSM-II, 16-7)2
In this, by convincing himself that there is no sky, no earth, no minds, no bodies (I), 
and by supposing that a deceiver of supreme power and cunning deceives himself 
(II), Descartes proves that he exists on the condition that he thinks (III). In this paper, 
I focus on the argument from the supposition of a deceiver. According to Gouhier, 
the deceiver is “a kind of methodological puppet,” “a methodological artifice to 
detain us in the doubt until we encounter with a first truth without falling into a trap 
of the probable.” The first truth is “I am, I exist,” because however powerful the 
deceiver is, for him to deceive us, we must exist (Gouhier 1973, 155-157). Then,        
in what way can we draw or find evidence that our existence can be drawn from our 
being deceived by a deceiver? In Gouhier’s view, it is not clear. At a glance, it seems 
that passage II says that we exist as an object of deception because for a deceiver to 
deceive someone, he, who is deceived, must exist. Some commentators interpret it    
in this way: Kenny, for example, insists that the supposition of a deceiver is not related 
to the self as a subject of thinking, but to the self as an object of deception, and that the 
self as such [latin: me] must represent something (Kenny 1987, 57). Similarly, Pariente 
insists that if X does not exist, X is not the victim of deception; if X is the victim of 
deception, X exists, and draws the existence of the self based on the relation between 
an actor (a deceiving thing) and an actee (a deceived thing) (Pariente 1999, 35).  
On the other hand, Dicker insists, “while it would be possible for a powerful 
deceiver to fool Descartes into thinking that he had a body even if he did not have 
one, it would be impossible for any deceiver, no matter how powerful, to fool 
Descartes into thinking that he was thinking when he was not thinking - for thinking 
that one is thinking is thinking” (Dicker 2013, 82). Moreover, Wagner insists that the 
“I” exists, not as a passive thing of an object of deception, but as a positive thing that 
exercises the causal power in generating the idea of a deceiver and the ideas of all the 
other things. According to him, all ideas in our minds are generated by means of the 
causal power of our minds, and the idea of a deceiver is just one of them (Wagner 
2014, 110 – 112).  
                                                        
2 In accordance with current practice, I use the abbreviation “AT” for the standard edition of 
Descartes’ works (Descartes 1964 – 1974), and “CSM” for the standard translation (Descartes 
1985). 
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As above, the interpretations that the earlier studies have shown is not a monolith. 
What did Descartes intend to conclude on the supposition “a deceiver deceives me”? In 
this paper, I will try to find out what is concluded from being deceived; it is not until 
we find out that we can finally understand Descartes’ thought on the cogito. Then I will 
search for some inherent characteristics of deception, and analyse the construction of 
the reasoning, “if a deceiver deceives me, I exist.” To be concrete, I show: 1) that it is 
not “I exist” but “I think” that is concluded from the supposition “a deceiver deceives 
me/I am deceived by a deceiver”3; 2) that the attributions of the self as a thinking thing, 
i.e. understanding, affirming, and denying (AT-VII, 28; CSM-II, 19), are discovered in 
the deceiver argument.  
This paper has a narrow scope and specialized object, but it shall provide the 
way to interpret the deceiver argument in the Second Meditation more precisely than 
ever before. 
2. Examination of the traditional interpretation 
In this section, I examine the validity of the interpretation that the “I” in the passage 
II exists as an object of deception. Here, I divide the argument of the Second Medi-
tation, which I quoted at the beginning of this paper, into three parts:  
 (1) If I convince myself that there is nothing, I exist.  
 (2) If a deceiver deceives me, I exist.  
 (3) So long as I think, I exist.  
The first argument corresponds to “if I convinced myself of something then I certainly 
existed,”4 the second corresponds to “I too undoubtedly exist, if [a deceiver] is 
deceiving me,” and the third corresponds to “[the deceiver] will never bring it about 
that I am nothing so long as I think that I am something”; such is the structure of the 
argument of the cogito in the Second Meditation. The questions here: what kind of 
relation is there between the first and second? What kind of relation is there between 
the second and third? Can we consider the “I” in the second as a mere object of 
deception or not?  
Firstly, what kind of relation is there between the first and second? One likely 
explanation is that they are separate and unconnected to each other. In this case, if we 
convince ourselves, we exist because for us to convince ourselves, we must exist; if 
                                                        
3 Indeed this conclusion is similar to Dicker’s one that the deceiver hypothesis cannot disprove the 
certainty of “I think,” but I will deal with the reason that this hypothesis can draw the certainty of 
“I think” in more detail.  
4 The original is past-tense; but I will not make distinction of tense.  
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a deceiver deceives us, we exist because for him to deceive us, we must exist. In this 
way, these two arguments draw the same conclusion of  “I exist” having no influence 
on each other. Figure 1 shows this relation:  
Fig. 1 
However, it is impossible to consider the first and second to be separate and 
unconnected to each other. In general, it seems that “I exist” can be established in the 
passage I, because “I convince myself” is one of the modes of “I think,” and “I think” 
is the condition of “I exist.” In the context of Descartes, however, it is not until we 
overcome a menace of a deceiver that we can draw our existence from “I convince 
myself” and “I think.” Descartes writes, “if I convinced myself of something then       
I certainly existed,” and adds, “but there is a deceiver of supreme power and cunning 
who is deliberately and constantly deceiving me.” Here, we pay attention to a junction 
“but [sed].” This junction signifies that even the conviction that we can convince 
ourselves of something is as subjected to the methodological doubt, as the conviction 
that we have a body, or that we can sense something, and so on. That is, the 
supposition of a deceiver of supreme power provides the possibility that although we 
do not convince ourselves, we are deceived by a deceiver into believing that we 
convince ourselves of something. Moreover, Descartes writes, “[...] I myself may 
perhaps be the author of these thoughts? In that case am not I, at least, something?” 
It is true that being the author of some thoughts is thinking of something, so at first 
[Passage I] 
(I convince myself) 
(I convince myself) → (I exist) 
∴ (I exist) 
[Passage II] 
(I convince myself)                             (A deceiver deceives me) 
    (I convince myself) → (I exist)             (A deceiver deceives me) → (I exist) 
∴ (I exist) 
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glance, the existence of the self seems to be drawn from being “the author of these 
thoughts”; however, Descartes denies this way and convinces himself that there is 
nothing. Therefore, both thinking of something (i.e. being the author of some 
thoughts) and convincing oneself of something cannot assure the certainty of one’s 
existence until a release of the supposition of a deceiver.  
As stated above, the status of one’s own mental acts is not privileged. This way 
of thinking owes its origin to Pyrrhonism. Montaigne writes in his Essays, referring 
to the Outlines of Phyrrhonism of Sextus (The Essays was Descartes’ favorite book):  
They only put out their propositions to contend with those they think we have in our 
belief. If you take their arguments, they will as readily maintain the contrary; ’tis all 
one to them; they have no choice. If you maintain that snow is black, they will argue, 
on the contrary, that it is white; if you say it is neither the one nor the other, they will 
maintain that ’tis both. If you hold, as of certain judgment, that you know nothing of 
it, they will maintain that you do: Yes, and if, by an affirmative axiom, you assure 
them that you doubt, they will argue against you that you doubt not, or that you cannot 
judge and determine that you doubt. And by this extremity of doubt, which jostles 
itself, they separate and divide themselves from many opinions, even of those that 
have several ways maintained doubt and ignorance (Montaigne 1930, 196).   
According to Montaigne, skeptics can have refutations to all judgements; they can 
refute that we doubt. Thus they should be able to doubt that we convince ourselves. 
But, for what reason? Descartes always needs firm reasons to doubt for the 
methodological doubt, which “is not [based on] a flippant or ill-considered 
conclusion, but is based on powerful and well thought-out reasons” (AT-VII, 21; 
CSM-II, 15). To doubt because Montaigne (or skeptics) tells to do so is to doubt based 
on thoughtless reasons; to avoid doing so, Descartes uses the supposition “a deceiver 
deceives me” as the reason to doubt “I convince myself” and “I am the author of some 
thoughts.”  
    From this point of view, to accept the supposition of a deceiver is to reject the 
validity of all knowledge, including the reasoning “if I convince[d] myself,                      
I exist[ed]” and “if I am the author of some thoughts, I am something”; thus, the first 
and second arguments are not separate and unconnected to each other. Figure 2 shows 
this relation:  
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Fig. 2 
As Fig. 2 shows, the premise “a deceiver deceives me” must be hold to assure the certainty 
of the conclusion “I exist” because this premise makes the first argument invalid. The 
superiority of the second over the first is kept until God’s honesty is proven. Since 
Descartes keeps the supposition of a deceiver through the whole of the Second 
Meditation, the premise “I convince myself” cannot draw the certainty of the existence of 
the self. In passage II, only the premise “a deceiver deceives me” can draw it5.  
    When we interpret in this way, can we consider the self as an object of 
deception? No: if we considered it as such, it would be very difficult for us to make 
the way from “if a deceiver deceives me, I exist”(2) to “so long as I think, I exist”(3), 
and the way from “I exist” to “I am a thinking thing.” For Descartes, “I exist” is simply 
not sufficient; it is more important that the “I” exists as a substance separated from a 
body, whose nature is only thinking, as Descartes says, “I am a thinking thing” (AT-
VII, 34) and “I think, therefore I am” (AT-VI, 32 – 33; AT-VII, 140; AT-VIII, 7 – 8; 
AT-X, 523). In passages II and III, Descartes writes, “I too undoubtedly exist, if                
[a deceiver] is deceiving me,” and adds, “he will never bring it about that I am nothing
so long as I think that I am something.” In this, the condition “so long as I think [...]” 
                                                        
5 For this reason, we cannot accept Kenny’s insistence that the premise “a deceiver deceives me” is 
hypothetical.  
[Passage I] 
(I convince myself) 
(I convince myself) → (I exist) 
∴ (I exist) 
[Passage II] 
(A deceiver deceives me) 
(I convince myself) 
(I convince myself) → (I exist)  
∴ (I exist) 
(A deceiver deceives me) → (I exist) 
∴ (I exist) 
*       means an erasure. 
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plays a necessary part of preparation for the advance from “I exist” to “I am a thinking 
thing.” However, if we considered the “I” in passage II as an object of deception, we 
would miss the relation between “if a deceiver deceives me” and “so long as I think,” 
and would not advance from the second argument to the third one. In the next section, 
I will analyse the relation between “if a deceiver deceives me” and “so long as I think.” 
3. Thought as an object of deception 
How can we insist that we exist so long as we think, based on the previous reasoning 
that we exist if we are deceived? To solve this question, I will focus on some inherent 
characteristics of deception in this section. It is true that Descartes’ 
deceiver/deceiving God argument is based on the traditional arguments6, of course; 
however, it seems that Descartes was aware of some inherent characteristics of 
deception, which his predecessors had not.  
*  
What kind of act is deception? It is defined as, to make someone believe a falsehood 
to be a truth, or to make someone believe a truth to be a falsehood. Then what is                 
a requirement for being deceived? – understanding, affirming, and denying. When we 
are deceived into believing that A is B although A is actually not B, we must affirm that 
A is B and deny that A is NOT B; moreover, we must understand the meaning of the 
proposition “A is B.” To be concrete, when we are deceived into believing that the earth 
is flat, for example, we must understand the meaning of “the earth is flat,” and affirm 
that the earth is flat, or deny the contrary (“the earth is NOT flat”). Thus, it is not until 
we understand, affirm, and deny something that we can be deceived7. In other words, 
our being deceived necessarily accompanies our understanding, affirming, and denying, 
i.e. our thinking8. Conversely, it is impossible to deceive things that do not think, i.e. 
matter. A deceiver schemes to alter the content of our thought, and the more he 
succeeds, the more certainly we think.  
From the point of view above, the premise “a deceiver deceives me/I am deceived 
by a deceiver” affirms “I think (since no one can be deceived without understanding, 
affirming, and denying, i.e. thinking),” not “I exist (since for a deceiver to deceive 
                                                        
6 Cicero and Suárez, who influenced Descartes, dealt with the deceiving God. See Brown (2013), 
25 – 42; Menn (2002), chap. 5, sec. B; Secada (2000), 44.  
7 Even though we try to deceive a young child of this matter, he/she cannot be deceived if he/she 
does not understand the meanings of the earth and flat.  
8 These three are modes of thought, as Descartes writes, “but what then am I? A thing that thinks. 
What is that? A thing that doubts, understands, affirms, denies, is willing, is unwilling” (AT-VII, 
28; CSM-II, 19). It is remarkable that these modes of thought, which are presented in the middle of 
the Second Meditation, are discovered in the deceiver argument.  
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Fig. 2 
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∴ (I exist) 
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(A deceiver deceives me) 
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(A deceiver deceives me) → (I exist) 
∴ (I exist) 
*       means an erasure. 
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someone, he/she must exist as an object of deception).” It is clear from his declaration, 
“let [the deceiver] deceive me as much as he can” that Descartes thought in this way: 
even after Descartes succeeded in drawing the certainty of his existence, he did not say 
“the deceiver does not always deceive me,” or “the deceiver failed to deceive me,” but 
“let him deceive me as much as he can”; this is his expression that we need not care of 
the deceiver any more and challenge to him. [Descartes leaves the deceiver as it is, 
although Gouhier and Wagner turn it into a product of will or imagination.] The 
deceiver can always deceive and mislead us, but every time he does so, he gives us the 
evidence that we think.  
In the end, the deceiver argument is a tool to draw the certainty of “I think.” In 
this reading, we can understand the relation between “if a deceiver deceives me” and 
“so long as I think” clearly, and advance from the second argument to the third one. 
We cannot reach “I exist” at a stroke from “if a deceiver deceives me”; we first reach 
“I think” from this premise, and if we think, we exist because we experience in 
ourselves that we cannot think unless we exist9. Then we cannot support Alquié’s 
opinion anymore that in the Meditations, unlike in the Discourse on Method and the 
Principles of Philosophy, Descartes puts existence above thinking (Alquié 1956, 92). 
In fact, in the Meditations, Descartes explains the indubitability of “I think,” from 
which the certainty of “I exist” is drawn, even more minutely than in all of the other 
works. In the Second Meditation, we must grasp this two-step order of thought: (1) 
from “I am deceived” to “I think,” and (2) from “I think” to “I exist.” The transition 
from “I am deceived” to “I think” is possible only after deliberation on the state of 
mind at the moment to be deceived. Through this deliberation, Descartes grasped the 
inherent characteristics of deception precisely, and could show the certainty of the 
cogito without excluding the deceiver: “let him deceive me as much as he can.” In 
this respect, Descartes is in contrast to Francisco Suárez, who denies instantly the 
possibility that God deceives us because God cannot deceive by its very nature, 
without deliberation on the state of mind at the moment to be deceived (Suárez 1614, 
IX, sec 2, vii).  
4. Conclusion 
The following are the conclusions in this paper:  
                                                        
9 Descartes writes, “when someone says ‘I am thinking, therefore I am, or I exist’, he does not deduce 
existence from thought by means of a syllogism, but recognizes it as something self-evident by                
a simple intuition of the mind. This is clear from the fact that if he were deducing it by means of                   
a syllogism, he would have to have had previous knowledge of the major premiss ‘Everthing which 
thinks is, or exists’; yet in fact he learns it from experiencing in his own case that it is impossible that 
he should think without existing” (AT-VII, 140; CSM-II, 100).  
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1) The first argument (“if I convince myself of something, I exist”) and the 
second argument (“if a deceiver deceives me, I exist”) are not separate and 
unconnected; the premise of the latter argument makes the former argument 
invalid.  
2) The “I” drawn from the second argument cannot be an object of deception 
because if so, we could not understand the relation between the second 
argument (“if a deceiver deceives me, I exist [as an object of deception]”) 
and the third one (“so long as I think, I exist”).  
3) The conclusion we can draw from the second argument is not “I exist” but “I 
think”; furthermore, we can discover in passage II the attributions of the self 
as a thinking thing, understanding, affirming, and denying, which are 
presented in the middle of the Second Meditation.  
Lastly, I comment on the cogito as the first principle. Descartes considers the cogito
to be “so firm and sure that all the most extravagant suppositions of the sceptics” 
(AT-VI, 32; CSM-I, 127) and “the most certain and evident of all” (AT-VII, 25; 
CSM-II, 17). It is not only because the cogito can be discovered at first that it can be 
the first principle; it is also because only the cogito can be established even if we are 
deceived by a deceiver of supreme power. The certainty of all the other things, i.e. the 
existence of matter, mathematical truths, etc. is not possible until God’s honesty is 
proven. However, we are certain of “I think” every time we are afraid that a deceiver 
deceives us. Descartes repeats, “let him deceive me as much as he can,” and shows 
the certainty of the cogito without excluding the deceiver; The fact that we can 
establish the cogito without excluding him is the very proof of the cogito being the 
first principle. 
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The paper deals with the concept of “human nature” and focuses on the question 
of what is the place of this concept, not only in the history of philosophy but also 
in the contemporary philosophical and scientific thought. The author aims to 
describe the concept of human nature by a historical overview of philosophical 
attempts to characterize it. The only way to construct philosophy for life, for 
future, for continuation of human history is a philosophical and scientific inves-
tigation. However, a strange thing is happening in modern philosophy: many 
philosophers do not seem to believe that there is such a thing as human nature. 
What makes this strange is that not only does the new attitude run counter to 
much of the history of philosophy but – despite loud claims to the contrary – it 
also goes against the findings of modern science. 
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Existuje niečo ako ľudská prirodzenosť,  
niečo, v čom tkvie podstata a jedinečnosť  
človeka. Na to, čo túto jedinečnosť vytvára,  
existovali rôzne názory, no myslitelia boli zajedno  
v tom, že existuje niečo, čo robí človeka človekom.  
(Fromm 2007, 222) 
Ľudská skutočnosť je priestorom takmer bez hraníc. Civilizačná a kultúrna vrstva, 
ktorá v nás postupom času síce spevnela, no je veľmi krehká, sa ľahko naruší – pô-
vodné atavizmy v nás sú pevnejšie a hlbšie, tie kultúrne a civilizačné im v hraničných 
situáciách odolávajú len ťažko, ak vôbec. Aká je architektúra ľudskej prirodzenosti, 
čo o nej vieme? Patrí vymedzenie ľudskej prirodzenosti k problémom a otázkam, 
ktoré – povedané s Kantom, plodí ľudský rozum, no odpovedať na ne nedokáže? 
Vstupujeme tu na pôdu metafyziky, teda – prinajmenšom podľa D. Huma – do „čírej 
ilúzie údajného rozumového poznania“ (Kant 1979, 67), ako jeho postoj pochopil 
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